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WIIEX Mustapha Kemal and the Grand X'ational Assembly
at Ankara began their sweeping reform program in Turkey
less than ten years ago, many observers expected failure for what
they saw as dictatorial imposition on a sullen and conservative popu-
lace. Historians recalled that Peter the Great had barely scratched
the surface in his attempt to Europeanize Russia ; that most of the
paternalistic innovations of Joseph II in Austria had died with him;
that Japan had "westernized" more gradually, less comprehensive-
ly, and under quite favorable circumstances ; and finally, that Tur-
key had Ioi\g since been given up as hopeless. A French writer,
Andre Servier, had summed up the opinions of many Christians
when he wrote. "The Musulman, bound by his religion, cannot ac-
cept Western progress : the two civilizations are too different, too
much opposed, ever to admit mutual interpenetration."
But to the confusion of such doubters the Kemalist reforms have
taken root, and the world has witnessed the unprecedented phe-
nomenon of a state which had long stood proudly as a proponent
of Islam abandoning luany of the most characteristic features of that
civilization and espousing in their place elements of an alien civili-
zation which it had for centuries viewed with hostility and contempt.
Turkey, geographically the westernmost country of Asia, has cut
the ties which have bound her so intimately to the East and seeks
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to become, outwardly at least, connected with Europe, the West.
Some one may now properly raise the question whether the
term "Islamic" is still applicable to modern Turkey. If Turkey
has g[one over so precipitately into the camp of the West, might the
conclusion not be justifiable that there had been a complete substi-
tution of one civilization for another, thus bearing out the exclusiv-
ists' essential concept of incompatibility, the impossibility of blend-
ing Islam and Western progress? The answer to this question will
gradually appear as we examine the history of the reform processes.
But first for the sake of clarity let us see what the words "Islamic"
and "Western" include when they refer to civilizations.
As most commonly interpreted, the term "Islamic" refers to the
whole complex of practices, beliefs and attitudes which have grown
up around the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed. In a narrower
sense, however, "Islamic" may be considered to apply specifically
only to the nucleus of religious beliefs and doctrines which gives
to the Moslem his characteristic world-view. In the West we are
accustomed to differentiate the broader and narrower correspond-
ing meanings by the terms "Christendom" and "Christianity."
Now where does the term "Western" fit in with the other con-
cepts we have been discussing? The Turk would probably con-
sider it the balance remaining if one were to subtract from the
totality of "Christendom" one part called "Christianity"—the be-
liefs and doctrines of the Christian religion ; in other words, the
materials and techniques of our civilization.
Two formulas might be invented to make plain the relation-
ship between the parts and wholes of the two civilizations: 1)
Christianity plus Western ideas and practices equals Christendom
;
2) Islamic religion plus Arab ideas and practices equals Islamic
civilization. This distinction which Turkey chooses to make be-
tween a religion and other parts of a civilization is important to un-
derstand before one reads the story of Turkey's Westernization.
Turkey apparently feels no qualms over the substitution of Western
ideas and practices for her inherited ideas and practices, since she
considers the latter a bequest from nomadic Arabia, which she pro-
fesses to despise as less civilized than Europe. Toward religion,
however, there is a different attitude, for she has failed to per-
ceive during centuries of rivalry and conflict any superiority of
Christianity over her own religious forms and doctrines. To change
religions would needlessly arouse a fanatical opposition, and be-
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sides, the Turkish leaders have felt that their traditional religious
organizations and beliefs might be purg-ed of undesirable qualities
and reshaped so as to contribute distinctively to the new Turkish
nation. The formula as conceived by Turkey's republican leaders
might then read: Purified Islamic relig-ion plus Western ideas and
practices plus a newly awakened nationalism equals modern Turkey.
Although we have spoken casually of Turkey's willingness to
abandon ideas and practices which she considered of alien Arab
origin and supplant them with Western counterparts, let no one
suppose that the change occurred rapidly or painlessly. Had it not
been for the constant erosion of Turkish society over many years
by powerful forces, had not Turkey been made acutely conscious
of her own shortcomings, had not the Great W\ir and its after-
math thrown Turkish society into a suitable state of flux, and had
there not been aggressive and inspiring leadership by bold patriots,
Turkey might still be floundering about uncertainly as are many
other parts of Asia. The point is, however, that all these condi-
tions did occur and that the radical reconstruction of Turkish so-
ciety did take place. Our task now is to consider in some detail
the factors and processes which contributed to the change.
Mention has been made of a long continued erosion of Turkish
society. Let us study this as the first of the important factors
leading up to the adoption of Western ways. Any one acquainted
even superficially with Turkey's history over the past hundred and
fifty years knows that interplay was taking place between Turkey
and the nations of Europe. Outside forces were pressing in on
"the sick man" with stringent diplomatic demands and strange new
practices. Here the process seems to be that of an external insistent
force battering with its novelties against a surly, resisting mass.
But the process had another aspect, for individuals within that
resisting mass were reaching out to master for themselves certain
features of the alien civilization, thereby acting as conductors in
the transmission of W^estern ways into Turkish society. Both as-
pects of the process, the battering and the conducting, are important.
The battering impact of the West may be illustrated concise-
ly, bearing in mind the fact that Turkey's geographical position as
the westernmost country of Asia and in a direct line between
Europe and important regions of the Near and Middle East made
it inevitable that she should be struck early and severely by Europe's
eastward-looking imperialist expansion. Aggressive warfare car-
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ried on by nations which sought to appropriate Turkish territory
caused Turkey to reaHze the superiority of Western war materials
and methods. Diplomatic interference in the governmental affairs
of the Sublime Porte kept officials unpleasantly conscious of the
asserti\e West. Industrialists and engineers skillfully exploiting
Turkish railways and natural resources impressed the Turks with
the value of Western technique. The system of capitulations, which
permitted foreigners to live in the country subject to their own laws,
kept constantly under Turkey's eyes communities with customs dif-
fering from her own. Partly as a result of the capitulations, mis-
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sionary and other philanthropic enterprises were given considerable
freedom in Turkish domain. Manned by devoted and able workers,
foreign schools, hospitals, and publication societies were powerful
agencies in the onslaught of the West.
The insistent impact of these Western thrusts might not alone
have been able to effect the erosion in the Turkish mass. Had the
ranks of Turko-Islamic society held firm, a stubborn and fanatical
resistance might have been offered which would have delayed in-
definitely the adoption of Western ways. But this was not to be,
for certain individuals and groups within the ranks manifested re-
ceptive inclinations toward the West, and the channels w^ere opened
for the infiltration of new notions. These channels were provided
by two types of Turks: 1) those who remained at home but be-
came interested in Western ideas through reading or through con-
tact with the Westerners in their midst; and 2) those who left home
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to visit Europe, voluntarily or as exiles. It is true that both the
stay-at-homes and the travelers were chiefly of the aristocracy and
upper strata of society, the official and military classes. They were
important, however, in performing" the function described bv E. A.
Ross as that of the "social stand-pipe" for the diitusion of advanced
ideas.
With this brief presentation of the double-action process of ero-
sion as it affected Turkey's Islamic civilization, we must turn next
to the second important factor which made reform a possibility : a
tendency toward bitter self-criticism resulting from a conscious-
ness of the shortcomings of her inherited civilization. This sense
of inadequacy which ^rew up in the nineteenth century under the
shadow of the insistent West was aggravated by the abortive at-
tempt of Abdul Hamid II to stir up a Panislamic movement. Far
from settling the problems of Turkey and the rest of the Islamic
world, this futile flurry of fanaticism served only to intensifv Tur-
key's distress when she finally came to admit the inferiority of
her Oriental ways to those of the Occident. The last twenty-five
years have accordingl}- given rise to strident arraignments of all
things Islamic, particularly of the theologians and rulers, who have
been branded corrupt, and also of the governmental system which
would permit so much influence to reactionary religious bigotry.
^^'hile at first the critics leveled their attacks indiscriminately against
the whole complex of Islamic civilization, a tendency is gradually
noticeable to make a dift'erentiation between the religious nucleus
and its secular appurtenances.
Of the numerous denunciations of the Islamic system, none
has had more influence than the poetic diatribe by Tewfik Fikret
called Tarilii Kadiiii (Ancient History). Though the poem was
not formally published until 1927, it had for many years circulated
from person to person and enjoyed great popularity among students
and others impatient with the vicious system to which thev were
bound. Tewfik Fikret portrays the glorious victories of his ances-
tors as actual savagery, and the heroes of the faith are shown to have
been killers, devastators of land and destroyers of homes. What
kind of God can it be, he asks, who permits such cruelty in the name
of religion? Does God hear or pay any attention to the prayers or
the blasphemies which drift upward to heaven? Everywhere doubt is
assailing the strongholds of religion ; stratagems and deviltry are
removing God from his throne and blowing out the torches in his
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temples. God has fallen from his throne, but no cries of pain are
heard. Instead one hears everywhere derisive laughter. Only the
stupid would bemoan the passing of such a gross deception.
A large share of indignant vituperation has been directed against
the Moslem theologians and doctors, whose ignorance, laziness,
and dishonesty are blamed for the dominance of tradition, form,
and superstition in a religious system which had once been progres-
sive and vital. Hans Kohn, in his masterly History of Nationalism
in the East, quotes the expression of a typical critical Moslem at-
titude : "The Ulemas of to-day occupy themselves with outward
forms alone ; they do not understand the philosophic spirit of Islam,
and cannot therefore apply their religion advantageously in prac-
tice. Our ignorant clergy expound Islam according to their own
ideas, and instead of benefiting, they injure us." A scathing de-
nunciation of the corruption, worldliness, and ignorance of the
theological teachers and students who posed as leaders of Islam
is contained in a strong novel published three or four years ago in
Istanbul from the pen of Rechad Xuri Bey. The book, entitled
Green Night, centers around the sacrificial devotion of a young
teacher to the cause of his nation and his people. The hero, Shahin
Effendi, enthusiastically enters a medresseh or theological school
only to suffer painful disillusionment when he perceives the knavery
and incompetence of his theological professors.
Along with the holy men, the Sultans of Turkey are subjected
to criticism for their subservience to the forces of religious bigotry.
The unholy alliance of secular despotism and religious obscurantism
is frequentlv and l)itterly denounced. As an example we may quote
from a textbook which is used in the schools of the Turkish Re-
public. From a Fifth Grade text in Civics, written by Mitat Sadul-
lah, and approved by the Department of P^iblic Instruction, comes
the following selection
:
The Padishahs ruled in Turkey for many years. These
men thought only of their own amusement and considered
the nation as a group of slaves. In Europe there had been
founded well-organized states according to new principles.
On the other hand, when a movement toward modern ideas
started in Turkey, the conservatives, the fanatical people
would step in and say, "This modernization is un-religious,
and it is sinful." With such trifling talk they would prevent
modernization. And already all the laws of the Padishah's
Government were based on the principles of religion.
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So it was impossible to separate worldly and religious
problems. As you know, religion teaches man more about
heavenly things, although it teaches at the same time truth
and goodness. One must not confound heavenly things with
problems of the world. As if it w/ere not enough to crush
the people under the title of Padishah, the old Padishahs took
the title of Caliph also, in order to give themselves impor-
tance in the public eye. These men who used to live in
palaces with all kinds of amusements and pleasures were sup-
posed to be representatives of the Prophet. They never
thought that religion is a concept of the conscience and that
nobody has the right to interfere with people's religious prob-
lems. The reason why men have organized states is not to
deal with heavenly problems, but it is only to assure the liv-
ing of a comfortable and joyous life in the world.
Similar sentiments from numerous other sources might be cited
if space were available. Let us, however, limit ourselves to one more
extensive quotation, this one condemning a governmental system
which permitted the dominance of religious laws. In an explana-
tory introduction to the new civil code which Turkey adapted from
that of Switzerland in 1924, the Minister of Justice, r\Iahmud Es-
sad Bey, laid the blame for Turkey's backwardness directly on the
deadening influence of the Islamic laws which for centuries had
formed the basis of Turkey's government and society. He wa-ites
:
. . . .the need for religions to be nothing more than a simple
affair of the conscience has become one of the principles of
modern civilization and one of the characteristic differences
between the old civilization and the new.
Laws which derive their inspiration from religions fet-
ter the societies in which they are applied to the primitive
epochs in which they arose, and they constitute invincible
factors which prevent progress. It is indubitable that our
laws, which came out of the changelessi precepts of religion,
and which ensured a permanent place to divine elements,
have been the most powerful and the most effective factor
which, in modern times, has enslaved the destinies of the
Turkish nation to the mentalities and institutions of the Mid-
dle Ages ....
In the march of our evolution one notices that all progres-
sive steps which have been attempted in the interest of the
masses have been thwarted by a class of men whose interests
were compromised by the projected innovations. These men
have always sought to turn people aside from the path of pro-
gress in preserving among them, in the name of religion, ob-
scure superstitions and false beliefs. Let us not forget that the
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Turkish people have resolved to accept without any reserva-
tion the principles of modern civilization. The most striking
proof of this appears in the Revolution itself. If in certain
quarters the civilization of to-day appears irreconcilable with
the needs of Turkish society, that does not indicate an apti-
tude lacking in the people, but in the superannuated traditions
and religious institutions which have hindered their develop-
ment. .
. .
When religion has sought to rule human societies, it has
been the arbitrary instrument of sovereigns, despots, and
strong men. In separating the temporal and the spiritual,
modern civilization has saved the world from numerous
calamities and has given to religion an imperishable throne
in the consciences of believers.
From what we have seen thus far, two important factors in
Turkey's change process are plainly apparent: 1) the penetration
—
by battering and conducting agencies—of Western notions into
Turkish society; and 2) the consequent agitated dissatisfaction with
the traditional Islamic heritage, gradually developing into a con-
viction that religion's influence must be allowed no specific con-
trol over public affairs.
Although these factors of Western penetration and internal
dissatisfaction had been evident in Turkey during the last half of
the nineteenth century and the opening years of the twentieth, up to
the close of the World War in 1918 little had actually been done,
even by the Young Turks, to incorporate Western ways into the
life of the Turkish mass. Europeans had brought their new tech-
niques into Turkey, and a relatively small number of Turkish in-
dividuals had taken over Western customs to an extent which varied
from superficiality on the one hand to extremity and consequent
excommunication from their own society on the other. Turkey had
begun to sense more and more the strength and vitality of the West,
and had begim to find fault with some of her own weaknesses, but
on the whole her Orient-sprung social forms had undergone but
slight changes. W'hat innovations had been introduced were really
only modifications of existing forms, not radical alterations or sub-
stitutions of Western practices in place of the venerable customs of
the ( )rient.
During the World War, however, and particularly in the years
immediately following it, a number of cataclysmic events occurred
which threw Turkish society into a state of flux. This stirring of
the Turkish population into a condition of fluidity stands as the
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third important factor which made possible the transformation of
civiHzations. On each of the cataclysmic events one might write a
volume. We must here content ourselves, however, with a mere list-
ing of them. First might be mentioned the Arab re\olt which broke
out in the later years of the Great War and o])encd the Turkish Em-
pire to attack from the Allies. Rebellions by subject Christian groups
were no doubt taken as a matter of course, but it was a preat disil-
:x rk.\.\( I-: lo modkkx hotel at axkara
lusionment to Turkey to be betrayed by co-religionists. The fact
that Moslem Arabs should have been disloyal made the Turks more
than ever hostile to the Islamic features of their civilization, which
they associated with Arabia. A second cataclysmic event was Tur-
key's collapse at the end of the Great War and the subsequent series
of humiliations which her foes sought to impose upon her as pro-
vided in the Treaty of Sevres. Third must be noted the down-
fall of the last Sultan-Caliph, A'ahid-ud-din, whose compliance with
Allied demands and hostility to the Nationalist movement was re-
garded by his subjects as treachery. Fourth was the ill-fated in-
vasion of Anatolia by the Greeks. Fifth might be the aid and en-
couragement offered by Soviet Russia to the budding Nationalist
340 THE OPEN COURT
movement as a blow at France and England. Sixth and last, the
division of counsels which ended the cooperation of France and
England in enforcing the terms of the Treaty of Sevres.
In the course of this extraordinary sequence of events Turkey
was grievously shaken ; in her Anatolian homeland she stood alone
facing a hostile world; she realized that her very existence de-
pended on heroic devotion and sacrifice. A new spirit of patriotic
dedication thrilled every loyal Turkish heart. Men were ready to
go to any extreme to insure the continuance and welfare of the new-
born nation. Turkish society had been melted into a malleability
which it had never experienced before. In those trying days, fired
by the new spirit of nationalism, Turkey was ready to be molded
by wise and courageous leadership.
The opportune appearance of capable leadership comprises the
fourth and final factor, which with the three already noticed, as-
sured the Westernization of Turkey. Outstanding figures such as
]^Iustapha Kemal, Ismet, Kiazim, Raouf, Adnan, and Halide Edib,
all admirers of the West, at first worked together to bring about
the new era of progress after the War of Independence had been
won. It so happened as a result of personal and political disagree-
ments that active leadership came into the hands of Mustapha
Kemal, whose generalship in the war against the Greeks had made
him the great national hero, and his efiicient comrade, Ismet. The
grateful and admiring Turkish nation, new-born from the turbu-
lence and turmoil of the post-war years, was theirs to do with it
what they willed. And their will was sweeping reform.
Kemal's policy, as he presented it in his classic Six-Day Speech
in the fall of 1927, was "to raise the nation to that position to which
she is entitled to aspire in the civilized world," which being inter-
preted, means the Western world. Any feature of her civilization
which might be construed as archaic, as smacking of the primitive
Orient, was to be eliminated. Thus using his enormous prestige and
his efficient. Fascist-like political machine, the National People's
Party, change after change was effected in Turkey's social and po-
litical structure. The venerable Sharia Law was replaced by a legal
system modeled on those of Western states. The Caliphate, re-
minder of a day w'hen Islam played too large a part in the adminis-
tration of government, was abolished. Men were ordered to adopt
the Western mode of dress. A thoroughly modern system of edu-
cation, using Western techniques and admitting the radical princi-
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pie of coeducation, was established. The Arabic alphabet was
abandoned as not fitted to the Turkish language, and Latinized let-
ters were substituted. The study of the Arabic and Persian lan-
guages in the schools was given up in favor of English and Ger-
man, French being already in the curriculum. Adult education on
an ambitious scale was instituted. In the new enthusiasm of national
pride, the studies of history and literature were purged of Oriental
Islamic features as much as possible, and new stress was laid on
the achievements of men distinctively Turkish. Marriage reforms
were instituted to enforce monogamy. In private houses and pub-
lic buildings Western architecture was employed. In Ankara a
school of music now introduces Turks to the instruments and com-
positions of the European masters. Students in all lines of en-
deavor regularly are selected and sent to Europe for study under
government supervision. In commerce, industry, and agriculture,
energetic attempts are under way to master the techniques and
methods of the A\'est, for no longer are there large populations of
Greeks and Armenians to carry on Turkey's business. One might
go on to enumerate dozens of important examples of the way Tur-
key's life is being reshaped in an efl:'ort to bring her thoroughly up-
to-date. AMiile many of them are still faf from achieving the effi-
cacy and completeness which are visualized, the point is that the
reforms have been undertaken and are being pursued with great
perseverance. And firmly behind each progressive innovation stands
the stern and visionary figure of jMustapha Kemal Pasha.
In the realm of customs, practices, and ideas not regarded as
religious, there has been, as we have seen, a wholesale substitution
of Western ways for those inherited from Arabia and Islam. In
the midst of all this readjustment, what has been the fate of those
institutions, rituals, and beliefs which are classified as religion?
There has, of course, been no tendency to replace this kernel of
Islam by a general conversion to Christianity, the religion of the
West. The new Government, having eliminated religious influences
from its political and social institutions, and having driven out of
the country the Dervish Orders and other elements regarded as
reactionary, has adopted an opportunist attitude toward religion.
On large segments of the population religion had a powerful hold.
To have attempted to disestablish the Islamic faith altogether w^ould
have provoked a hostility which might have hindered the prompt
achievement of other reforms. The policy, therefore, has been to
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tolerate its continuance, eliminating such features as may not be
in harmony with the general policy of reform, and encouraging any
cle\-elopments or modifications which might strengthen the spirit
of national progress. Control of religious affairs has been kept in
government hands through the constitution of a Committee on Re-
ligious Affairs, which functions as a sub-department under the Prime
^Minister. Among the interesting and important modifications which
have taken place are the replacement of the old nicdrcssehs by schools
which equip the modern liodja to serve both as religious leader and
primary school teacher in his community : the preparation of ser-
mons on national issues to be preached in the mosques during holy
festivals ; and the translation of the Koran into Turkish, thus mak-
ing it generally intelligible.
In ])ringing to a close this brief study of Turkey's cultural trans-
formation, it is to be hoj^ed that these points have been brought
out : that the successful implantation of Western reforms is no
mere vagary of chance—there are reasons for their success in Tur-
key where other countries have met with failure ; that Andre Ser-
vier's certainty regarding the incompatibility of Islam and the West
is open to question ; and that the following formula may be taken
as descriptive of the present situation : Purified Islamic religion
plus Western ideas and practices plus a newly awakened national-
ism equals modern Turkey.
